The Partially Examined Life Philosophy Podcast

Continuing on on Just and Unjust Wars (1977), ch. 5-6. When might it be morally permissible to strike first? When is it permissible (or obligatory?) to intervene in another country's internal affairs militarily? We discuss Walzer's historical examples and apply his theories to current wars. Get more at partiallyexaminedlife.com . Visit partiallyexaminedlife.com/support to get ad-free episodes and...

On Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument With Illustrations (1977), ch. 4-6 on "jus ad bellum," which refers to moral justifications for going to war. Self-defense is permissible while aggression is not, but this leaves many questions unanswered, and Walzer gives us many historical examples to consider. Get more at partiallyexaminedlife.com . Visit partiallyexaminedlife.com/support to get ad-free...

Continuing on the 1785 course lecture notes by Georg Ludwig Collins. We cover duties to oneself, which are actually the most important ones. There are some interesting subtleties even though Kant is clearly a creature of his time and place, e.g. in his views of sexuality. Get more at partiallyexaminedlife.com . Visit partiallyexaminedlife.com/support to get ad-free episodes and tons of bonus discu...

We discuss lecture notes from Kant's 1785 ethics course, which provide more examples and an emphasis on the practical than his more famous works. For instance, we get more information on ethical motivation: How can the rational recognition of ethical principles lead to moral feelings? Get more at partiallyexaminedlife.com . Visit partiallyexaminedlife.com/support to get ad-free episodes and tons o...

LA Second City improv instructor Mary joins us to act out a pet sitting job interview, talk about sharing our public spaces with animals, and finally return to Empty Street to see if we can get some animal action going in the mart. In the post-game, we talk about Bill's new academic studies and Mark's upcoming Gen Con trip. Hear more at philosophyimprov.com . Support the podcast and listen ad-free...

Concluding our treatment of The Sources of Normativity . We give Korsgaard's tweaks to Kant, including her distinction between the categorical imperative and the moral law. We then explain her reference to Wittgenstein's private language argument in her argument that reason-giving, and hence morality, can't be merely self-referential. Get more at partiallyexaminedlife.com . Visit partiallyexamined...

On lectures 3 and 4 of The Sources of Normativity (1996), where we get Korsgaard's positive view on how morality becomes obligatory for an individual, which has to do with identity, reason-giving, and our fundamentally social nature. And yet, her view is an interpretation of Kant! Get more at partiallyexaminedlife.com . Visit partiallyexaminedlife.com/support to get ad-free episodes and tons of bo...

We dive further into the text of lectures 1 and 2 of The Sources of Normativity (1996). We give Korsgaard's account of the idea of reflective endorsement through Hume and Bernard Williams to get to her own view. When you come to know the origins of your moral sentiments, do you still stand behind them? Get more at partiallyexaminedlife.com . Visit partiallyexaminedlife.com/support to get ad-free e...

On The Sources of Normativity (1996), lectures 1 and 2. How are facts related to obligations? We don't want to merely explain our moral impulses, but justify them. Korsgaard walks us through the views of Hobbes, Hume, Bernard Williams and others to arrive at her own breed of Kantianism, which we'll lay out in ep. 371. Get more at partiallyexaminedlife.com . Visit partiallyexaminedlife.com/support...

Continuing on Natural Goodness , getting more into concrete cases of moral reasoning. How and why do we decide to keep promises, even in cases where violating them would produce more utility? How do we take into account different kinds of grounds in moral reasoning? Get more at partiallyexaminedlife.com . Visit partiallyexaminedlife.com/support to get ad-free episodes and tons of bonus discussion,...

On Natural Goodness (2001). Can we base ethics on the model of biology? Foot argues that just as we understand what a healthy specimen of a plant or animal is, so there is a natural way for humans to work properly, which will include the ability to will according to reflective reasoning. Get more at partiallyexaminedlife.com . Visit partiallyexaminedlife.com/support to get ad-free episodes and ton...

We conclude our discussion of A Treatise of Human Nature (1739): Book III, "Of Morals," plus a bit more discussion of An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751).  How do moral sentiments fit into Hume's overall philosophy of mind? Is Hume a relativist? We talk about sociopaths, animals, incest, consent, ethics vs. beauty, moral luck, and more. Get more at partiallyexaminedlife.com . Vis...

We talk a bit more about David Hume's An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), and add some parts of A Treatise of Human Nature (1739): sec. 3 "Of the Influencing Motives of the Will" within the third part of Book II, "Of the Passions," and the first two sections of Book III, "Of Morals." Can reason by itself motivate moral action? Hume says no: All ethical reasons must point ultimat...

Continuing on An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751), talking about justice (i.e. property laws), why utility is pleasing and what all it includes, sympathy, utility vs. beauty, and more. Get more at partiallyexaminedlife.com . Visit partiallyexaminedlife.com/support to get ad-free episodes and tons of bonus discussion.

On David Hume's An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751). What is morality, and how can we know it? Hume claims that we simply find ourselves with sentiments morally approving and disapproving of various things. Characterizing these post hoc, we can say that in general we approve of what brings utility, and this explains the existence of most laws and mores. These may vary by culture...

Continuing on The Problem of Empathy . What does it mean to say that we know other people's mental states "non-primordially"? We talk about Stein's project of explaining how empathy is possible, what it gets us, and how her answers differ from Scheler's. Get more at partiallyexaminedlife.com . Visit partiallyexaminedlife.com/support to get ad-free episodes and tons of bonus discussion. Sponsor: Ge...

We put our recent episodes on moral phenomenology into perspective, anticipating our upcoming Hume discussion and going through some other options to enrich this study of sentiment vs. rational intuition. Plus, more potential author-guests and recent philosophy book coverage. If you're not hearing the full version of this discussion , sign up via one of the options described at partiallyexaminedli...

On The Problem of Empathy (1917). What is empathy, and what is its significance? Stein pictures empathy as a dynamic process that involves what Scheler called sympathy but goes beyond this. Your don't just take the other person's feeling as our object of contemplation, but in doing so, your enter into it (while still not confusing it with YOUR feeling), this relating to it "non-primordially." So h...

We conclude our treatment of Max Scheler's The Nature of Sympathy (1922), getting further into the Part II of the book about love and hatred and grappling with the puzzles about what exactly it is we love about someone (the "personality"). Get more at partiallyexaminedlife.com . Visit partiallyexaminedlife.com/support to get ad-free episodes and tons of bonus discussion. If you enjoy our podcast,...

On The Nature of Sympathy (1922), Part II: "Love and Hatred." What is love, and how does it relate to ethics and to sympathy? For Scheler, love is a primitive, spontaneous movement from lower to higher values: We see the best in the love one and thereby help enable them to attain that excellence. So is love foundational for value, or is value foundational for love? The two seem to arise together....

Mark, Wes, and Dylan reconvened for one more hour on Part I, "Fellow Feeling" (ch. 3-4) in The Nature of Sympathy (1913/1922). We continue to try to figure out the razor's edge of "fellow feeling proper" that does not rely on the sympathizer identifying in any way and look into psychological and metaphysical ways that people can identify with others. Get more at partiallyexaminedlife.com . Visit p...

Continuing on The Nature of Sympathy (1913/1922), Part I: "Fellow Feeling," Ch. 1-4. We look more closely at the text, getting further into how fellow feeling relates to ethics, and why the moral sentimentalists (like Hume) were wrong about this. Get more at partiallyexaminedlife.com . Visit partiallyexaminedlife.com/support to get ad-free episodes and tons of bonus discussion.

On The Nature of Sympathy (1913, expanded 1922), Part I: "Fellow Feeling," Ch. 1-4.  What is it to feel sympathy (aka "fellow feeling") for another person? It is NOT to "identify" with that person; ethics requires that the person be irreducibly Other, not part of my (extended) ego. Get more at partiallyexaminedlife.com . Visit partiallyexaminedlife.com/support to get ad-free episodes and tons of b...

On Edmund Husserl's Ideas, Vol. 2  (1928), Section 3, "The Constitution of the Spiritual World," Ch. 1, "Opposition Between the Naturalistic and Personalistic Worlds." Given Husserl's method of "reduction" whereby he sets aside the metaphysical status of objects in the natural world (are they mind-independent or merely ideas?), we wanted to see how he accounts for our ability to directly perceive...

Continuing on "The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong" (1889), getting into how we measure the comparative value of things. While Brentano does observe actual practices in these areas, his phenomenology detects moral facts that can be used to cast judgments of people's actual practices, saving him from relativism. Get more at partiallyexaminedlife.com . Visit partiallyexaminedlife.com/supp...