Root Causes: A PKI and Security Podcast

A recent CISA report declares that the nation's OT infrastructure is incapable of keeping up with the crypto agility and certificate management needs that modern security demands. We examine this finding.

Microsoft has publicly stated that it will hand over Bitlocker keys to US law enforcement agencies without requiring a subpoena or court order. These keys can be held by users rather than Microsoft, at their option. We dive into this topic.

We usually think of Certificate Lifecycle Management (CLM) as a security category. But we could equally well categorize it as an operations category that enables uptime. In this episode we make our case.

We introduce the concept of a "digital parasite," explaining why this attack philosophy appears to be on the rise.

In a recent blog post Google made five recommendations for policy makers. We walk down the list.

CAA records exist to restrict issuing CAs for a given domain to as few as one CA. But what happens when the CAA record outlives the CA to which it restricts issuance? Join us to find out.

It would be easy to believe that the amount of risk posed to the WebPKI by any individual public CA is somehow proportional to the number of active certificates that CA has. This is false, however. In this episode we address this misconception.

We recently heard the argument that it's simply too expensive to develop a cryptographically relevant quantum computer. We vehemently disagree. In this episode we explain why.

In this episode Tim explains that the transition to PQC is not just a change in cryptographic algorithms but also a fundamental shift in how we treat our cryptography. From here on out, IT systems need to be fundamentally crypto agile in a way we've never had to be before.

Jason describes a recent intrusion almost entirely operated by off-the-shelf AI tools. This is an important milestone in security. We describe its potential consequences.

We expand on the concept of trust-now-forge-later to list a whole bevy of additional attacks that eventually will be enabled by cryptographically relevant quantum computers.

We all love a good manifesto! Jason spells out the ten principles of the Cryptographic Inventory Manifesto, and we discuss.

We all love a good manifesto! Jason spells out the ten principles of the Cryptographic Inventory Manifesto, and we discuss.

We look at the new European DORA and NIS2 regulations and how Certificate Lifecycle Management is a key requirement to meet these requirements. You will be surprised how explicit these requirements are.

We look at the new European DORA and NIS2 regulations and how Certificate Lifecycle Management is a key requirement to meet these requirements. You will be surprised how explicit these requirements are.

In an innovative application, an AI has been used to find private keys for ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) P 256. We explain how.

Recorded in Ottawa Ontario.

New research indicates that the number of qubits necessary to achieve cryptographic relevance has reduced by two orders of magnitude. We cover this breaking news and its implications.

By CABF ballot all manual methods of Domain Control Validation (DCV) will be deprecated by 2028. We explain which methods are due for deprecation and when.

We go over the qualities in abstract of a use case that strongly invites the use of hybrid certificates and then run down a list of specific use cases that meet these criteria. This includes OT systems, code signing, secure boot, WiFi, enterprise S/MIME, and more.

In this episode Jason declares that we must make cryptography boring again. We get into what that means and why it matters.

We have seen much talk of the upcoming drop of maximum TLS term to 200 days, followed by 100 days, and eventually down to 47 days. It happens that all those numbers are too large and the actual maxima will be less than that. We explain.

March 2026 is due to be the most eventful month in the history of the WebPKI. Join us as we go over all the many changes coming next month.