The Principles of War - Lessons from Military History on Strategy, Tactics, Doctrine and Leadership.

We continue our discussion with Dave Sabben, picking in the in the second half of July. The base was being heavily reconnoitered.  We discuss the preparation for the defences at Nui Dat.  Dave suggests that Canberra believed that the base was considered to be safe and unlikely to be attacked. The South Vietnamese intelligence was treated as suspect, as was the US intelligence because a lot of it w...

We discuss the terrain in Phuoc Tuy, including Long Tan and the defensive base at Nui Dat. We discuss the demarcation in responsibility between the ARVN and the Australian troops and the impact of ARVN having responsibility for dealing with the roads and villages.  We also discuss the strategic hamlet program and the impact of resettling the population out of Long Tan village and the creation of a...

Dave Sabben describes his experience when he joins D Coy, 6 RAR.  Dave makes an important point, many of the officers and SNCOs were newly promoted into their roles, a function of the rapid expansion of the Army. Fifty percent of the diggers in Delta were National Servicemen. In March 1966, 6 RAR is notified that they will be going to Vietnam.  Delta left in early July, The first birthday of 6 RAR...

This lecture is presented by Dr Rhys Crawley, the author of Climax at Gallipoli. Dr Crawley compares artillery at Gallipoli with the employment of artillery in 1915 on the Western Front.  Artillery was still seen as an accessory for the artillery, rather than as a separate arms distinct from the infantry. What lessons where learnt at the Battle of Neuve Chappelle and how were those lessons applied...

We look at the Scheyville Experience.  This is important because it highlights the process required to train junior officers to be able to lead soldiers into combat and to win. Scheyville had 1883  graduates, 1690 were National Serviceman,  355 served in Vietnam, and 8 gave there lives in Vietnam.  We look at the syllabus at OTU Scheyville, and we talk to Dave Sabben about his experience at Scheyv...

We start our look at the Battle of Long Tan, which occured on the 18th August 1966, 4km east of the Australian Task Force base at Nui Dat.  Outnumber 20:1, the Australians took 18 KIA and 24 WIA in one of the most important and most famous battles of the whole Australian involvement in Long Tan. Our guide through Australian Military's History most famous rubber plantation is Dave Sabben.  Dave was...

Why did the soldiers hold short of their objectives on the first day of the landings at ANZAC? The 3rd Brigade were the first to land at Gallipoli.  Why did COL Sinclair-Maclagan hesitate?  How costly was this action? What was the Turkish dispositions on the morning of the 25th? If third ridge had been taken, what would have the impact for the campaign been? Check out the  show notes  for the podc...

Brigadier Muhammad Asgharpresents a fascinating look at the forgotten gunners of Gallipoli, the 7th Mountain Indian Artillery Brigade, comprising the 21st (Kohat) Mountain Battery and 26th Jacob's Batteries.  These Batteries become a part of the 1st Mountain Regiment in 1947 in Pakistan. Jacob's Battery was the only gun in action on the 25th of April at ANZAC. On the 26th of April Jacob's Bty was...

In 1911 the NZ Government purchases 18 pounders and 4.5 inch howitzers as it starts to modernise. Their first deployment was to German Somoa, as a part of the Samoa Expeditionary Force, retaking the islands from the Germans. The ANZAC the NZ guns land, howitzers,  on the 26th of April, 1915 and the field guns lands on the 27th. Constrained by lack of suitable firing positions and ammunition, they...

This bonus episode of the Firepower Seminar looks at the role of Naval Gunfire Support at Gallipoli by Commander David Stevens, RANR. What issues did NGFS have at Gallipoli? How where targets identified and how was command and control managed? As a secondary effort, there was to few guns at Gallipoli and the Navy attempted to make up the difference.  What was the impact the NGFS on the Gallipoli c...

MAJ Daryl Kelly OAM looks at the human side of the Gunners at Gallipoli. He looks at some of the stories of the individual Gunners who served at Gallipoli, looking at the conditions and at Gallipoli during the landing operations.   Check out the  show notes  for the podcast for images and more details for this and other podcast episodes. Join the conversation on  Twitter  or  Facebook. If you've l...

We continue our discussion on the Center of Gravity with COL Dale Eikmeier. How important is the relationship between different CoG?  What impact does this relationship have for operational planning? Does the CoG breakdown when their are multiple actors?  How are they related and how does it impact in planning an operation?  What is the best way to deal with the increasing complexity?  Does the Ce...

We talk to retired COL Dale Eikmeier about the Ends, Ways and Means methodology for determining the Center of Gravity. We talk about some of the problems with the Clausewitzian Centre of Gravity construct.  What role do the critical factors, critical capabilities, critical requirements and critical vulnerabilities play in the discovery of the Centre of Gravity. We discuss the new Center of Gravity...

Whilst everyone agrees that determining the Center of Gravity is really important, but there is not a lot of information on the actual process to do that. We look at the inside out methodology by Rueschoff and Dunne as a way of determining the CoG.  This methodology starts with objective, then looks at the critical capabilities that allow the achievement of the objective. We pause to look at the r...

Artillery doctrine was updated after some of the lessons from the Boer War. What was the role of the artillery at the beginning of the war? How was artillery integrated into the infantry plan?  What was the preferred method of employment, indirect or direct, and why? How was artillery organised? What was the role of the CRA (Commander Royal Artillery) and what resources did he have? What fire supp...

Hannibal was clearly one of the best Generals in history.  How could he win 3 major battles against Rome, but he wasn't able to win the second Punic war. We discuss the definition Center of Gravity, where it came from and why it is so confusing and why Hannibal and his staff may have struggled with the concept of Centre of Gravity. Has the meaning of the Center of Gravity been lost in translation?...

In a surprise move, we look 2,200 years to look at the Battle of Cannae, a defeat so severe that it is said that every mother in Rome mourned the death of a son.  How could such a crushing defeat of a Roman Army. In 1992 the Center of Gravity construct was introduced into LWD 1, The Fundamentals of Land Warfare and it has been confusing people ever since. What is it?  How to build one to give you...

We look at the remaining principles of Manoeuvre Warfare in the conduct of the Malaya Campaign. Percival attempted to be strong everywhere and was never able to generate enough combat power to slow the Japanese. We look at the loss of Force Z and how it decreased the Allied ability to influence the war at sea and the sea lines of communication.  The loss of Force Z created an exponentially deterio...

In the time that we have been producing the Malaya Campaign series in The Principles of War, the Australian Army has produced a new version of the LWD 3-0, so Army Doctrine is moving faster than this podcast! We look at the new doctrine and the application of Manoeuvre Warfare. We look at the  application of tenets of manoeuvre theory. Focusing friendly action on the adversary centre of gravity. A...

LT COL Charles Anderson was placed in a very difficult moral dilemma at Parit Sulong. We look at his actions in WW1 in Africa and his Reserve service in the interwar period and how he comes to be the CO of the 2nd/19th Battalion. We also briefly look at BRIG Maxwell, the previous CO of the 2nd/19th. Check out the resources for this podcast , specifically the books by Farrell and Pratten.  We look...

A lot of this story has come from an audio interview of LT Russell 'Bill' McCure.  It is an amazing record of the preparation, conduct and aftermath of his participation in the Malaya Campaign. LT McCure started out in the 53rd Ack Ack Search Light Bty and he wanted to join the 2nd AIF.  The only way was for him to obtain a commission.  He undertook that and was assigned to the 58th Infantry Batta...

As we transition to look at some vignettes of Leadership in Malaya, we pause to look at the composition of the 8th Division. The Commander, Bennett, was a CMF soldier, as were the 3 BDE COMDs.  In Malaya, only LT COL Boyes, CO of the 2/26th Bn was PMF.   The 8th had more regular officers than the 6th Division, which was the first 2 AIF Division to be raised. We look at Walter Brown VC.  He was awa...

Good leadership, thorough training and success on operations will all contribute to high morale.  We contrast LT COL Stewart and with other units.  The Indian and Australian armies had a lot of new troops, with varying degrees of training.  This contrasts with battle hardened IJA troops, some who had many years of experience. Kampar was the high point for the Allied morale. The conduct of the with...

We look at how the Japanese were able to use operational manoeuvre from the sea as a part of their approach to flexibility.  We look at their history of amphib operations and how they developed their capability. We look at the Shanghai Incident and how the IJN demonstrated their already impressive amphib capability.  The Japanese are able to launch 3 independent landings to start the offensive in...

Sustainment - often the least considered of the principles.  How did logistics impact the conduct of the Malaya We look at the interplay of logistics between the forces.  There The Japanese were operating from an amphibious operation which severely constrained their operations.  The British were fighting a defensive battle, with a lot of trucks on well made roads. What was the relationship between...