Ivor Ludlam

The Plato Paradigm

Society EN ↓ 273 episodes

Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go. The resulting analyses may be found at: https://theplatoparadigm.com

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Author

Ivor Ludlam

Category

Society

Podcast website

www.spreaker.com

Latest episode

Oct 23, 2026

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Episodes

0098 Meno 79c 17.06.2023

Socrates wraps up the series of answers Meno has given about virtue by ensuring that he cannot give a fourth answer without suddenly changing and applying some dialectical thought to the subject. Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go. The resulting analyses may be found at: https://theplatoparadigm.com

0097 Meno 78d 10.06.2023

Socrates concludes his criticism of Meno's third answer about virtue by labouring the point that an action in itself is neither virtue nor vice [not correcting Meno's notion that the whole of virtue or vice is a particular action], but is virtue if done with a part of virtue (it follows that it is vice if done with a part of vice). Socrates not only shuts down any future answer about virtue which...

0096 Meno 78c 02.06.2023

Having discarded the first part of Meno's third answer concerning virtue, Socrates turns to the second part, and soon establishes that Meno is still thinking of the virtue of the man. Of all the possible ways to refute this yet again, Socrates simply adds "justly" and (instead of "soundmindedly") "piously" to the explanation of virtue, but Meno fails to predict the impending refutation. Here I rea...

0095 Meno 78b 26.05.2023

Having treated the first part of Meno's third answer about virtue last time, this time Socrates explains why it is redundant. Having concluded sophistically last time that there is no one who does not desire good things, Socrates exploits one further assumption made by aristocrats like Meno, that virtue is a characteristic of someone exceptional. If all people desire good things, then this desirin...

0094 Meno 77b 19.05.2023

After Meno's third answer to the question, "What is virtue?", that it is someone desiring fine things and being able to acquire them, Socrates begins his examination of the statement by apparently questioning whether there are people who do not desire fine things. Socrates actually indulges in some sleight of hand worthy of a sophist. Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and comment...

0093 Meno 77a 12.05.2023

Meno's third answer regarding virtue is "Someone desiring fine things and being able to acquire them". Socrates will begin his examination of this next time, but we already consider some of the problems now. Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go. The resulting analyses may be found at: https://theplatoparadigm.com

0092 Meno 76d 05.05.2023

Socrates and Meno discuss which of the three sample answers they each prefer, although it isn't clear which one Socrates prefers or why. Socrates entices Meno to continue the discussion by hinting at an initiation into the mysteries. We learn that Meno and Socrates conversed yesterday as well. Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go. The resulti...

0091 Meno 76c 28.04.2023

The third example Socrates gives of the sort of answer he expects from Meno is even worse than the previous two, although Meno accepts this one enthusiastically. The first answer had been that shape is the only thing which always follows colour, and Meno had called that one silly, since the recipient of the answer might not know what colour is; the second, that shape is the end of solid, was perfo...

0090 Meno 76a 21.04.2023

Meno avoids having to answer again the question what virtue is because Socrates allows him to. Immediately after Socrates' second reply regarding shape, Meno asks what colour is, and Socrates plays the erastes (lover) to Meno's eromenos (beloved), pretending to give in to the demands of the younger man. Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go. T...

0089 Meno 75d 14.04.2023

Socrates provides a second definition of "shape" (schema), but this time ensuring that Meno agrees beforehand to the various elements forming the explanation. Things are not as obvious as they seem (obviously). Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go. The resulting analyses may be found at: https://theplatoparadigm.com

0088 Meno 75b 07.04.2023

Socrates pretends to help Meno give him an answer to the question "What is virtue?", which would explain every virtue, by providing a sample answer to the question "What is shape?", applicable to all shapes. Socrates encourages Meno to criticize it, spurring him on by noting that it's now Meno's turn to answer the question "What is virtue?", which Meno apparently will avoid by any means. Although...

0087 Meno 74e 31.03.2023

Socrates is making a meal out of Meno's inability to give a simple answer to the question what is X in all instances of X. He would like Meno to give an answer to what is shape, for this to serve as an exercise (meletē) towards Meno's later answer regarding virtue. Socrates points out that this "What is X?" problem is applicable to all things, such as shape and colour. Meno bargains with Socrates,...

0086 Meno 74b 25.03.2023

Meno has recalled Gorgias' two answers concerning virtues perfectly, but one gives many virtues, the other only one virtue, but not applicable to all. He is thus out of options which might satisfy Socrates' question, to say what that virtue is which is in all, and it is up to Socrates to keep the conversation on virtue going. He suggests that they go back and look at shape and shapes which had bee...

0085 Meno 73d 17.03.2023

Meno's second attempt at explaining what virtue is by using Gorgias' other reply out of context is already doomed to failure, but Socrates adds to the problems by deliberately adding to Meno"s "being able to rule humans" the adverb "justly", which is only a part of the general adverb "well", thus inviting a list of many other virtues from Meno which, being virtues, are not the one virtue Socrates...

0084 Meno 73c 10.03.2023

Socrates once again asks Meno for an answer given by Gorgias despite having dropped the sophist from the conversation a little earlier. This second answer makes sense in Gorgias' context, but it does not follow in the present context. Socrates therefore is carefully manipulating Meno into making a series of apparent errors. We may ask ourselves why. Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translat...

0083 Meno 73a 04.03.2023

Socrates completes his argument moving virtue away from the "what" to the "how", from particular activities appropriate to types of people and towards virtue as the appropriate way in which any activity is done. This allows all types of people to be good in just one way, common to all - they do what they do "well" - which is in stark contrast to Meno's first answer, the list of many different virt...

0082 Meno 72d 24.02.2023

Socrates attempts to steer Meno away from regarding virtue as the task appropriate for each particular individual to do, towards the way in which anything is done (well, justly, with self-control). The means by which Socrates attempts to do this suggest that he realizes that Meno is not amenable to strict logical. We may also note that despite Socrates emphasizing that he is looking for the one as...

0081 Meno 72a 17.02.2023

Socrates explains that he is looking for the aspect of arete (virtue), the one thing which is common to all the different types of arete. Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go. The resulting analyses may be found at: https://theplatoparadigm.com

0080 Meno 71d 10.02.2023

Socrates turns the tables. Instead of saying what sort of thing he thinks arete (virtue) is, he manipulates Meno into telling him what Gorgias says arete is. Meno answers in the style of Gorgias, generously and without fear. Each type of person according to gender, age, and social status has an appropriate role or task, and this is a virtue. Meno is happy to say that there are very many virtues, h...

0079 Meno 71b 04.02.2023

Socrates finally manages to get Meno to react despite not selecting one of the choices Meno gave him regarding the sort of thing arete (virtue) is. Meno reacts to the suggestion that someone not knowing Meno at all would not know what sort of person Meno is, but immediately turns to the scoop that Socrates doesn't know at all what arete (virtue) is ( for which reason Socrates claims not to know wh...

0078 Meno 70c 27.01.2023

Socrates continues his reply to. Meno's first question since Meno fails to react to any of the shocking things Socrates says. Having portrayed Gorgias as a seller of sophia, teaching people to be able to answer any question put to them, and having adopted Meno's conception of abstracts as concrete things, it follows that Gorgias' move from Attica to Thessaly has resulted in a drought of sophia in...

0077 Meno 70a 21.01.2023

Socrates begins his reply to Meno's first question Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go. The resulting analyses may be found at: https://theplatoparadigm.com

0076 Meno 70a 14.01.2023

Meno's first question is not what it is usually considered to be. It is about the sort of thing arete (virtue) is, and not whether Socrates can tell Meno how to acquire virtue. Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go. The resulting analyses may be found at: https://theplatoparadigm.com

0075 Politeia (Republic) 07.01.2023

This is a barebones summary of my full analysis of Politeia in my 2015 book entitled Plato's Republic as a Philosophical Drama on Doing Well, Lexington Books, with special emphasis on the explicit use of paradeigmata in the dialogue. Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go. The resulting analyses may be found at: https://theplatoparadigm.com

0074 Hippias Major 4 of 4 30.12.2022

Final part of the summary of my analysis of Hippias Major. The original analysis was published as Hippias Major: An Interpretation (Palingenesia XXXVII), Stuttgart 1991 My more recent article assessing Hippias Major and Minor together may be found in “Plato on the Good: Hippias Minor and Hippias Major ”, in Y.Z. Liebersohn, I. Ludlam, A. Edelheit edd. For a Skeptical Peripatetic: Festschrift in Ho...

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