The Plato Paradigm

This is the second part of the overview of the dialogue Meno. Once again, we see that nothing actually said should be taken as the words of Plato himself, and that the philosophy must be found in what is more consistent in the dialogue, namely the characters themselves. Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go. The resulting analyses may be found...

This and the following podcast provide a brief summary of the dialogue Meno, emphasizing the lack of philosophical content in what is said. To put it another way, the philosophy of Plato is not to be found in the words spoken by the characters. We should start thinking about the characters of the dialogue, which is only possible through listening to what they say. Here I read through Platonic dial...

Before reaching conclusions regarding the dialogue Meno, I thought it would be helpful to provide an overview of the general structure of a Platonic dialogue (at least, of the ones I have analysed), with the aid of the examples of Euthyphro, Hippias Minor, and Hippias Major (to these may be added the overview of Politeia, aka Republic, in episode 75). Here I read through Platonic dialogues, transl...

The end! Who would be the politikos who could make another person politikos?  If reasoning has led to the fourth option proposed by Socrates, is it not episteme, and if so, why should it be reexamined? Socrates leaves Meno with an outline of the dialectic method. Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go. The resulting analyses may be found at: ht...

Socrates provides Meno with a new answer to the question asked by Meno at the beginning of the dialogue. Virtue comes to people through divine lot. Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go. The resulting analyses may be found at: https://theplatoparadigm.com

What is the significance of good politicians being called divine? Why does it matter that not only women but also Spartan men think this way? We find out that all through Socrates' unflattering portrayal of good politicians as people lacking sense, Anytus has been listening, and appears to be, according to Meno, upset. Is this at all important for our understanding of the philosophical import of t...

Socrates continues his attempts to make Meno think even while leading up to his grand conclusion. Politicians don't understand what they are talking about. This is a given. However, Socrates is supposed to be demonstrating that they have true opinion as a guide to beneficial acts. This he emphatically does not do. Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text...

Socrates begins his last attempt to shock Meno into reacting to the ramifications of his own opinions and assumptions. If Meno is now happy that virtue not a knowledge (episteme) since there are no teachers of it (this itself is a false premise), then those good politicians (politicians with arete) guide cities without episteme. Socrates likens the senseless politicans to prophets and seers, to ea...

Socrates concludes the confused summary of the arguments since the hypothesis that virtue is something teachable by setting up episteme and orthe doxa as the two things which lead well and beneficially,  only. to eliminate episteme on the specious claim that no one teaches it, leaving orthe doxa, correct opinion.  However, Socrates does not go to orthe doxa. He claims that politicians rely on eudo...

Nearing the very end of the conversation, Socrates tries one last time to cause Meno to recollect, by seriously conflating and confusing 1. a summary of the hypothesis that virtue is teachable and 2. the discussion about understanding and true opinion. Socrates fails, since Meno agrees to everything Socrates says, as if each false remark exactly reflects what was said earlier. Here I read through...

Socrates continues to dwell on the similarities between episteme and orthe doxa - they are both good, and therefore beneficial, as are the men who have either of them. Socrates proceeds to recap the discussion from the time Meno gave up answering the question what arete is by returning to ask which of the four options is held by Socrates, concerning the type of thing arete is - teachable, exercisa...

I discuss the difference between correct opinion (orthē doxa) and understanding/knowledge (epistēmē), explaining why only understanding/knowledge is useful. Socrates, for his part, asserts his true belief that correct opinion is no worse than understanding/knowledge, and Meno confirms Socrates' belief, saying that Socrates is speaking correctly. Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating...

Socrates uses the statues of Daedalus as a way to explain to Meno how opinions (doxai) differ from pieces of knowledge (epistemai). One episteme, according to this account, is one doxa bound by "a reasoning of cause" (aitias logismos). Socrates suggests that they had agreed to this during the discussion of recollection (anamnesis), which is patently false. Meno once again fails Socrates' attempt t...

Correct opinion (orthē doxa) and knowledge (epistēmē) are slightly distinguished by me, if not by the conversation between Socrates and Meno. Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go. The resulting analyses may be found at: https://theplatoparadigm.com

Meno wonders why people regard knowledge as so much more valuable than opinion, given that correct opinion leads to the same results as knowledge. Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go. The resulting analyses may be found at: https://theplatoparadigm.com

The infamous road to Larissa argument supporting the notion that orthodoxy (correct opinion) is as beneficial as knowledge, given that it leads to the same destination. Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go. The resulting analyses may be found at: https://theplatoparadigm.com

Socrates tests Meno's ability to remember or "recollect" previous arguments in the conversation, but Meno is blissfully unaware of all the outrageous distortions Socrates perpetrates. Then it was prudence (phronesis) which was the guiding principle leading to acts being performed correctly and well by an individual, Now Socrates suggests that they were correct in thinking that good men could lead...

Socrates having established that there are no teachers or students of virtue, Meno wonders whether there are any good men at all, or if there are good men,  how they come about. It is the second question which Socrates begins to answer by returning to an apparent mistake they had made much earlier in claiming that people act correctly and well only when episteme (knowledge/understanding) is guidin...

Socrates finally concludes his argument demonstrating that neither sophists nor the "fine and good" think that virtue is something teachable. The number of times he asks Meno versions of this question throughout the argument suggests that Socrates would have liked Meno to notice one of the many problems in the argument. After completing the argument, we return to a consideration of the Theognis in...

Socrates concludes his quotations from Theognis, overtly to demonstrate that even an individual can believe that virtue is something teachable, but then (in the same poem), that virtue is not teachable. Apart from this point being philosophically redundant (it is enough that Meno is aware that he and the Many cannot decide whether sophists and good citizens are able to teach virtue or not), it is...

Socrates carries on the discussion about teachers of virtue by returning to the question whether virtue is teachable. Meno and the other politikoi are not alone in wavering on the question, since even Theognis contradicts himself in this very matter. Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go. The resulting analyses may be found at: https://theplat...

Socrates continues interrogating Meno about virtue being something teachable. Having agreed that virtue is not something teachable if the teachers of it disagree, and then Meno himself having shown that the sophists disagree among themselves, Meno fails to conclude the sophists are not  teachers of virtue. This has no bearing on the teachability of virtue, but we do learn that Meno has made no pro...

Anytus has just left, and Socrates and Meno are now free to say what they like about him. Socrates continues his demonstration that virtue is not something teachable, given that there are no teachers of it, as appears evident from his discussion with Anytus. Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go. The resulting analyses may be found at: https:/...

Anytus leaves with a scarcely veiled threat that Socrates will get himself into trouble if he keeps badmouthing people. This is not so important as the fact that he is exemplifying what he said earlier about decent Athenian citizens making better those people who are prepared to be persuaded by them. Here I read through Platonic dialogues, translating and commenting on the Greek text as I go. The...

Socrates demonstrates to Anytus inductively that that virtue of the Athenian citizen qua Athenian citizen is not something teachable. Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles, and Thucydides are all shown to have wanted to educate their sons, and that their sons were capable of learning, but that none of the sons ever acquired this particular arete. We'll have a look at the validity of this argument next...