The Grenfell Tower Inquiry Podcast

This week, three politicians gave evidence. Eric Pickles, former housing secretary, told the Inquiry that he could not understand how the government’s deregulation agenda could have discouraged civil servants from tightening fire safety standards, describing this as “inexplicable and unjust”. Stephen Williams, the minister responsible for implementing the coroner’s recommendations after a previous...

This week, civil servant Brian Martin completed his evidence after more than seven days. In his concluding evidence, he said that there were several occasions on which he believed he could have prevented the Grenfell Tower fire from happening. And – almost five years on – politicians appeared for the first time. Two former ministers with responsibility for fire safety, Brandon Lewis and Lord James...

This week, senior civil servant Brian Martin continued giving evidence to the Inquiry. As the only person to testify with experience working for both the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government and the Building Research Establishment, the Inquiry learnt about the intricacies and inadequacies of his role overseeing building regulations guidance. He conceded that he had underestimated...

This week, the Inquiry heard from three senior civil servants: Dame Melanie Dawes, the former permanent secretary at the Ministry for Housing, Communities and Local Government, said that she had not been informed about the risk of combustible insulation on high-rise buildings and conceded that the department had systemic failings. Brian Martin, a significant figure who was responsible for the fire...

This week, the Inquiry heard about the work culture in the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government and how Richard Harral, the Head of Technical Policy, was left feeling angry, frustrated and so “deeply ashamed” that he quit three years into the role. The Inquiry also heard from Sir Ken Knight, the government’s former Chief Fire and Rescue Advisor, who was asked why he didn’t react s...

This week the Inquiry heard from inside Whitehall, as two civil servants, Bob Ledsome and Anthony Burd, gave evidence. It was revealed that the All-Party Parliamentary Group on fire safety chased housing ministers 16 times about a promised revision to the building regulation guidance. And we heard about a briefing that was prepared a few days after the Grenfell Tower Fire, which described the depa...

This week, the Inquiry heard from Debbie Smith, a senior figure in the Building Research Establishment for more than 34 years. She failed to speak up at a meeting with the government two days after the Grenfell Tower fire about the “immediate and present risk to life” ACM panels on buildings over 18 metres presented. And there was a significant milestone, as Anthony Burd, a former senior civil ser...

This week the Inquiry heard that cladding similar to that installed on Grenfell Tower underwent a “catastrophic” fire test 16 years earlier. Sarah Colwell, Director of Fire Suppression Testing and Certification for the Building Research Establishment (BRE), described the speed of flame spread as “shocking”. We also heard that the BRE failed to alert the industry about widespread and potentially da...

This week, David Crowder, former Head of Investigation at the Building Research Establishment, told the Inquiry that an investigation into the Lakanal House fire in 2009, was shut down by the Government although it was “fundamentally incomplete”. David Metcalf, the Director of Window and Cladding Technology, explained how confusion over the use of the word “filler” in building regulation guidance...

This week, the Inquiry heard how the National House Building Council (NHBC) approved Kingspan’s combustible cladding insulation for many years. John Lewis, a fire engineer at the NHBC, admitted that a desire to collaborate with industry was a “corrupting” influence on their actions. It was also revealed that two days after the Grenfell fire, a senior civil servant asked the NHBC to support in publ...

This week we heard closing statements for two modules of the inquiry on firefighting. Lawyers for the London Fire Brigade (LFB) and those representing the Bereaved, Survivors, and Residents (BSRs) strongly disagreed over the responsibility of the LFB for the failure to arrange an early evacuation of Grenfell Tower. The lawyer representing one of the BSR groups, Leslie Thomas, proposed a “Hillsboro...

This week the Inquiry questioned representatives from both the National House Building Council and Local Authority Building Control about the steps they took to restrict or approve the use of combustible materials in the years before the Grenfell Tower fire. Steve Evans, an NHBC manager, was warned at a conference 18 months before the Grenfell fire about the dangers of the combustible cladding whi...

This week the Inquiry turned its attention to how building regulations were set and combustible materials tested and certified. Lawyers for the bereaved, survivors, and residents accused the government of concealing crucial information from previous fires, and industry bodies of knowingly approving unsafe building materials. Barry Turner, the former Director of Technical Policy at the Local Author...

Andy Roe, Commissioner of the London Fire Brigade, made a series of frank admissions this week. He said the LFB was aware of every single problem that contributed to the Grenfell Tower fire in advance of the night. A former LFB Commissioner, Ron Dobson, also gave evidence. He answered questions on why some of the recommendations that the Brigade committed to after the 2009 Lakanal House fire weren...

This week evidence was presented by former London Fire Brigade Commissioner Dany Cotton, who previously told the Inquiry that the LFB could not have prepared for a fire like Grenfell Tower. This time, she conceded that in the years leading up to the fire, the LFB failed to take on board national guidance that warned how combustible cladding could lead to rapid fire spread, as it did at Grenfell. E...

This week the Inquiry continued to look at how the London Fire Brigade (LFB) trained its Control Room staff to deal with emergency calls. Evidence was provided by Joanne Smith, the Senior Operations Manager in the Control Room on the night of the Grenfell fire, and Tom George, former Assistant Commissioner for Operational Response accountable for staff training. The Inquiry heard how the LFB’s tra...

This week the Inquiry looked at how the London Fire Brigade (LFB) trained its Control Room staff to deal with emergency calls. Evidence was given by Scott Hayward, former LFB Principal Operations Manager, and Joanne Smith, the Senior Operations Manager in the Control Room on the night of the Grenfell fire. The Inquiry heard how leading up to Grenfell there were a series of failures to improve the...

This week the Inquiry focused on the London Fire Brigade’s firefighting policies for high-rise buildings. Peter Cowup – former Assistant Commissioner of the LFB’s Operational Policy Department, and Patrick Utting from the LFB’s Operational Policy Team told the Inquiry how the LFB updated their policies in light of fires in South London in 2009 and Southampton in 2010. Presenter: Tom Symonds; Produ...

This week the inquiry saw the closing of one module and the beginning of another. The opening statements for module six looked at how local and national policies guided the work of firefighters on the night of the fire. In the closing statements for module three, we heard about how the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and the Tenant Management Organisation carried out their duties regarding...

The inquiry heard evidence from expert witnesses on the London Fire Brigade’s preparedness for the Grenfell Tower fire. Fire safety expert Professor Jose Torero argued that the LFB lacked the technical knowledge which would have allowed them to understand how the fire was behaving. The inquiry also heard from expert witness Chris McGuirk on the LFB’s information gathering policies, and from Profes...

Paul Grimwood, a fire engineer at Kent Fire and Rescue Service, developed an alternative approach to firefighting in high rise buildings in 2008. The approach allowed incident commanders to assess which of four firefighting strategies - rescue, intervention, containment or evacuation - should be prioritised. Lawyers from the bereaved, survivors and residents of Grenfell Tower have questioned why t...

This week we learned that a member of the London Fire Brigade’s Fire Safety Team wrote that giving advice on the risks of high rise cladding fires could be the ‘cat out of the bag on this issue’. The inquiry also heard evidence from the LFB’s former director of operations. Dan Brown said that at the time of the Grenfell Tower fire more than 5,000 high rise buildings were not present on the brigade...

The “uncontrolled spread of fire across the outside of tall buildings is a significant threat”. The inquiry revealed that weeks before the fire at Grenfell Tower LFB staff wrote a presentation which warned of the risks of façade fires weeks. The inquiry heard evidence from a Deputy Commissioner, Director of Operational Resilience and Training, and Assistant Commissioner and Head of Fire Safety. Pr...

“The simple fact is that the LFB did know. They knew, and lives could and should have been saved”. This week the inquiry heard new evidence about the management of the LFB and how it trained its staff ahead of the Grenfell Tower fire. A lawyer representing a group of the bereaved, survivors and residents said his clients did not want heroes in the LFB, “but well trained professionals working to a...

“Truly a case of donkeys led by donkeys”. This was how a lawyer for a group of the bereaved, survivors and residents described lead contractor Rydon, the firm of architects Studio E and specialist cladding contractor, Harley Facades. Core participants submitted closing statements, marking the end of the first two sections of Phase 2 of the inquiry which heard evidence about the refurbishment of th...