The Ancient Art of Modern Warfare

The United States of America is a republic founded on democratic principles. Not a democracy, but a republic. That means that, except in rare circumstances, the citizens do not vote on issues at the national level. Instead, we elect representatives of the people and of the component states of the United States to make those decisions. That does not, however, absolve those citizens for decisions ab...

Why do we study old battles? Historic examples of strategy help us to understand enduring lessons about why nations win or don’t win wars. But historic battles and campaigns were fought using weapons, tactics, and other technology that have little relevance to modern warfare. What is the value in studying them and if we should, then how should we go about it? This episode describes one technique:...

In Episode 64, Why Wagner, I said one possible risk associated the Wagner Group is the potential that, like previous elite and ostensibly politically reliable mercenary forces, Wagner could be a threat to the Russian government. But what is the likelihood of that happening? This episode explores how military or paramilitary forces might turn on their own governments in a coup d’état.   Disclaimer:...

In the past few months, Moscow has used the Wagner Group as the centerpiece in recent military operations in Ukraine.  This is very different from how Wagner has been used in Africa. Why is Putin giving a quasi-mercenary organization such a central and visible role in its war with Ukraine? There could be different reasons, each of which present advantages and significant risks: risks for Putin, fo...

The difference between war and terrorism is that war is, in theory, governed by international law, whereas terrorism is criminal in nature and execution. So where does that leave the use of mercenaries in modern warfare, and particularly the infamous Wagner Group? Are they terrorists? Are they legitimate combatants? Are they both or something else? Can official designation as a Foreign Terrorist O...

If there is one thing that pacifists and generals agree on, it is that war is terrible. The dictionary definition of terrible is “causing terror.” If war, by its very nature, causes terror, then what is the difference between war and terrorism? I explore that in this episode, leading up to the next episode, where I will apply this information to the war in Ukraine. That is the subject of the next...

What if I told you that neither Total War or Limited War reflect reality? Further that the West's concept of limited war only limits the ability of states to achieve the only acceptable goal of any war?   For further reading: Stoker, Donald, Why America Loses Wars: Limited War and US Strategy from the Korean War to the present, ISBN978-1-009-22086-6 Summers, Harry, , On Strategy ISBN-10 ‏ : ‎ 0891...

With the current war in Ukraine, it may seem obvious that conventional war is still important. But less than a year ago, many prominent military experts said otherwise. Some writers and opinion leaders still maintain that the current conflict is an exception, an aberration, and focusing on conventional war, or traditional warfare does not prepare us for future conflict. They are wrong.

Twitter and You Tube can present an inaccurate picture of modern warfare. In the previous Podcast, I described how the tank continues to be relevant on the modern battlefield, despite social media images. This same social media depicts Combat aviation of all varieties falling from the sky on a daily basis, without apparent battlefield effect. Col. Jayson Altieri, US Army Retired, and instructor at...

Video clips show Russian tanks in Ukraine blowing up after being hit by various anti-tank guided missiles. Moscow has lost so many tanks that some reports say they are forced to pull obsolete models from reserve stocks or even museums. The conclusion in popular media is that the tank is dead, obsolete as a weapon of modern combat. I think that the tank is as important today as any time in history....

Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine disproves many recent predictions about the future of war. This includes the predictions about the death of the law of war. The perception of the legitimacy of war depends in large part on seemingly ancient notions of Jus Ad Bellum and Jus in Bello. The war in Ukraine shows that legitimacy, or loss of legitimacy, has serious consequences.   For more information on the...

The primary purpose of any nation’s military force is to fight and win its wars. However, the military instrument of national power does much more than that. Most of those things keep the nation from having to fight wars. US and NATO support to Ukraine provides examples of the non-conflict roles of the military instrument.   If you think this material is worthwhile, please hit the like button, lea...

Since 2014, Moscow has used mercenaries in Ukraine, Syria, Africa, and other places to exert military power without accountability. Although these mercenaries, commonly referred to as the Wagner Group, never left Eastern Ukraine, they are now active again with the Russian invasion. Why? What is their value in a conventional war? What dangers do they present? That is the subject of this episode. If...

Russia's use of Militias in the ongoing war has been very different than Ukraine's. The way these militias and auxiliaries act as an element of a nation’s military power will reflect the goals, objectives, and strategic vision of the nation that is using them. The danger is that forces that do not fulfill the criteria of a legitimate belligerent under the law of war undermines disciplined and effi...

The military element of national power is not just regular armed forces fighting on the battlefield. This episode begins to look at the varied means and methods of using military power, once again drawing observations from the current war in Ukraine. I  begin with the use of militias and mercenaries.

We live in an information age. How can the use of information, in all its forms, be a decisive tool in warfare? I look at the war in Ukraine to describe how the West is being influenced by Information as a tool of national power.

If war is a continuation of political intercourse with the addition of other means, what are those other means? How do we apply them for success in war and operations short of war? What does that mean for Ukraine?  This podcast begins to answer those questions by looking at Economic Warfare.

In 1938 the Western powers allowed Nazi Germany to annex the border regions of Czechoslovakia and, a few months later, dismember the rest of that country. Some people say that this model is replaying itself today. Have we learned from history? Have others learned lessons we have not?

Initiative, Imagination, Independence. These principles seem more important than ever in today’s vague, ambiguous, complex, and uncertain strategic environment. But, has the United States gone in another direction? COL Jayson Altieri of the USAF Air War College joins me to discuss this.

What does a Prussian general, a product of the enlightenment, have in common with a Greek commander who studied under Aristotle? More important, how does that continue to affect warfare in the 21st century?

Can one man change warfare, or history? I asked colleagues for their recommendations. Everyone's list included the same name. Alexander of Macedon. His vision changed warfare and the world, with effects that continue to this day.

If war is a human endeavor, can the actions of one person, against all odds, change the course of a battle or a war? Times may bring out the man, but sometimes one person can change history.

War is a human endeavor and, by its nature, a social activity. Success in war depends on understanding the enemy's cultures to identify strategic weakness and red-lines that must not be crossed.

In the previous episode I proposed that Tolstoy’s statement that all happy families are alike and that all unhappy families are unhappy in their own way, might also apply to success and failure in war. In that podcast, I asserted that that all successful wars are alike. Now I will explore the idea that every unsuccessful war is unsuccessful in its own way.

Tolstoy's novel Anna Karenina begins: "All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way." Could this line from the author of “War and Peace” also apply to war? That is the topic of this episode of the Ancient Art of Modern Warfare.